Hollinger's Team Forecast: Sacramento Kings
By John Hollinger
ESPN Insider
The uniforms were the same, but by the end of 2005-06 you'd have hardly recognized these Sacramento Kings. In a 12-month span the club changed out three-quarters of its roster, with Brad Miller, Mike Bibby and Kevin Martin the only players who were with the team at midseason of 2005.
The housecleaning was necessary and probably overdue, and I doubt it's done yet. Even before the season, the Kings had the look of a team teetering on the brink of collapse, as the Chris Webber trade from a year before had signaled the beginning of the end of their early-century excellence. They brought in Bonzi Wells as a one-year stopgap at shooting guard to replace free-agent escapee Cuttino Mobley, added Shareef Abdur-Rahim with the midlevel exception, and gambled that their thin bench wouldn't be exposed.
Unfortunately, Abdur-Rahim was limited by a broken jaw, Peja Stojakovic and Miller started showing their age, and Wells missed 30 games. The only positive development to offset those disappointments was the emergence of a shooting guard, Martin, who had done nothing as a rookie but sported one of the league's top true shooting percentage marks in his sophomore campaign. As a result, the Kings seemed a tired, old team, with a glaring lack of athleticism and a profound inability to stop opponents. As the trade deadline neared they were mired at 19-27 and it seemed their string of playoff appearances was coming to an end.
With things looking down, the Kings took the ultimate gamble -- they traded for Ron Artest. The mercurial forward had worn out his welcome in Indiana, but Sacramento figured his combo of defense and toughness was exactly what it needed. The Kings sent Stojakovic, a free-agent-to-be, to the Pacers in a deal that really had limited risk for Sacramento -- it was either do this or blow up the team.
Artest immediately paid dividends, helping the Kings tidy up their defense. Sacramento roared to a 25-11 finish and captured the West's final playoff spot, then took two games off San Antonio before bowing out in the postseason. Sacramento went from giving up 99.9 points per game before the trade to 94.0 afterward, and their opponent field-goal percentage dropped from 45.9 percent to 44.7 percent.
That said, the win-loss record exaggerates the extent of the improvement. Though Sacramento began the year 19-27, it was also extremely unlucky, having given up only 0.4 points per game more than it allowed. Second, the later half of the Kings' schedule was much kinder -- 21 of their final 36 games were in the friendly confines of Arco Arena. And that six-game series against San Antonio? It included losses by 11, 22 and 34 points. Over the six games, they were outscored by 57 points.
For the season, Sacramento ranked almost as high at the defensive end (13th in defensive efficiency) as it did offensively (11th). While Artest was a major reason, a lot of credit also has to go to Rick Adelman. Despite his lame-duck status, he was able to get solid defensive efforts from an undermanned frontcourt and one of the league's least athletic lineups.
Offensively, it was hard to believe this was still the Kings. Instead of the running-and-gunning, long-range bombing teams of yore, this was a halfcourt outfit that liked to pound it inside. Sacramento's offense after the trade was completely inverted -- wingmen Wells and Artest would be posting up while big guys like Miller and Kenny Thomas hung around on the perimeter. But it was effective, despite some very disappointing shooting numbers from Artest (38.3 percent after the trade).
Sacramento also had its share of off-court drama, as the continuing battle between the city and the owners over a new arena has cast doubt on whether the team will remain in town. Owners Joe and Gavin Maloof have strong Las Vegas ties and the NBA seems to be thawing its stance toward putting a team there (to the delight of countless media members, the city already has been awarded this year's All-Star Game), so it's not too hard to connect the dots. It would be a shame considering the crowd support the team gets -- Sacramento has 313 consecutive home sellouts -- but there's no doubting that Arco Arena is outdated.
OFFSEASON MOVES
Kings GM Geoff Petrie has thrived over the past decade by staying a step ahead of the competition. This summer wasn't one of his better ones, though, with the lone major personnel move likely leaving the team much worse off.
• Fired Rick Adelman, hired Eric Musselman. After nine years in Sacramento, it wasn't easy to part with Adelman. One of the more underrated coaches of the past two decades, he's taken a lot of heat for his team's playoff failures. But few coaches have been better at maintaining cohesion, or picking out his seven guys at the start of the season and sticking to that rotation all season. One could argue his message was getting stale, but how stale could it have been to the 10 new players on the roster? It seems the real problem was that the owners were tired of the coach, not the players.
Fortunately, Adelman's replacement is a solid choice. Musselman did creditable work in his previous gig at Golden State, and since that was his first NBA head coaching job one hopes he learned plenty as well. He doesn't have an easy mandate in trying to coax an aging team with a volatile star back into the postseason, and it will be harder because both the Kings and their fans are used to making the playoffs and will blame him if they don't.
• Signed John Salmons, let Wells leave. Letting Wells go was the easy part. He supposedly was asking for $10 million a year, even after everyone else ran out of cap space and he had no leverage, so at some point the Kings had to move on. Even without the contract demands, I would have let Wells walk. I know he and Musselman are tight, but isn't having Wells and Artest in the same clubhouse a bit like lighting a cigarette at a gas station?
However, the decision to go after Salmons looks fishy. The Kings gave a five-year, $25 million deal to a guy whose production in Philadelphia was positively piddling. While Kings' fans will point out that two other teams -- Toronto and Phoenix -- clamored to give him a similar deal, the cold reality is that Salmons isn't particularly young (he turns 27 in December), hasn't played particularly effectively (he ranked 46th out of 58 shooting guards in player efficiency rating), and wasn't the best player available (for instance, J.R. Smith and Kirk Snyder could have been had just by asking nicely). Petrie rarely screws up a personnel decision, but this one sure seemed like a panic move.
• Signed Loren Woods. Woods found the only team that's thinner than he is. For most teams, I wouldn't even mention this pick-up, but Sacramento has so few bench options that Woods might need to play regularly so it warrants a few lines. The competition between him and Vitaly Potapenko for the backup center job promises to be the NBA's least-exciting training camp battle.
• Drafted Quincy Douby. A late first-round pick, Douby is another guy who probably will have to play right away because the Kings are so thin. He's a shoot-first, Eddie House type who will play both guard spots, but he'll probably play more at the point since the other contender, Jason Hart, had such a miserable campaign a year ago.
BIGGEST STRENGTH
Ballhandling. This always has been a Kings' strength and should again this year. From top to bottom, nearly every important player on this team is an above-average dribbler and passer for his size, and historically that's made the Kings very difficult to defend. Start with Miller, one of the best passing big men in the game and a deft left-handed driver despite his lack of speed. Thomas and Abdur-Rahim also handle the ball very well for their size, with Thomas comfortable playing out high and Abdur-Rahim even pushing it out on the break on occasion.
On the perimeter there's more where that came from. Artest, Francisco Garcia and Salmons all can handle the ball like a point guard, so much so that the Kings probably won't even play the man who is theoretically Bibby's backup (Hart). Artest played point forward on several occasions after the trade last season, while Salmons' primary asset as a player is his ability to handle the ball at 6-7. The only weak ballhandler among the rotation players is Martin.
BIGGEST WEAKNESS
Frontcourt size and depth. Um, these guys know they only have three big men …right? I mean, I'm as glass-half-full as the next guy, but this looks like a recipe for disaster. Miller began showing his age last season and doesn't figure to be any fresher after playing for the U.S. national team all summer. Abdur-Rahim has missed time with injuries each of the past two years, and Thomas is no stranger to the trainer's room either.
Moreover, none of the three can give the team the interior presence it so desperately needs at the defensive end. Miller is a high-skill guy but has no elevation and little quickness, while Abdur-Rahim and Thomas both are small for power forwards -- let alone the center spot.
As a result, we could be looking at some serious ugliness coming off the Sacramento bench. Between Woods, Potapenko, and Corliss Williamson, at least one and probably two players will have to play significant minutes. If they're as bad as I expect, it's going to put a major dent in the Kings' win total.
2006-07 OUTLOOK
Because of the strong finish, a lot of people are expecting big things from the Kings this year. Don't count me as one of them. As I pointed out above, once you adjust for victory margin and home-road differential, the Kings' second-half surge wasn't quite as potent as it first seemed. Additionally, replacing a quality performer like Wells with a mediocrity like Salmons is bound to knock a few games off the Kings' record.
Losing Wells also hurts because the Kings are so lacking off the bench, with their best reserve a year ago (Martin) now forced to start. The frontcourt has obvious weaknesses, but the backcourt is no picnic either -- just to have a decent seven-man rotation would require either Salmons or Garcia to play much better than a year ago, or Douby to hit the ground running.
Then there's the other question -- who on this team will be better than last year? Bibby is 28, Thomas and Abdur-Rahim are 29, and Miller is 30. Martin is younger but his true shooting percentage from a year ago looks decidedly fluky, so any improvements in his game this year might be offset by fewer shots finding the net. One hopes Artest will play better than he did after the trade last season, but the only King one could predict improvement from with much confidence is Garcia -- and he needs to improve just to be a decent bench player.
All told, I'm not sure Musselman realizes quite how difficult the task before him is. Sacramento can make a playoff run if nobody gets hurt in the frontcourt and Artest and Bibby perform near the top of their range, but everybody in the West can make an argument along those lines. The most likely scenario is that they limp home a couple games short of .500, and a couple games short of a playoff spot.
By John Hollinger
ESPN Insider
The uniforms were the same, but by the end of 2005-06 you'd have hardly recognized these Sacramento Kings. In a 12-month span the club changed out three-quarters of its roster, with Brad Miller, Mike Bibby and Kevin Martin the only players who were with the team at midseason of 2005.
The housecleaning was necessary and probably overdue, and I doubt it's done yet. Even before the season, the Kings had the look of a team teetering on the brink of collapse, as the Chris Webber trade from a year before had signaled the beginning of the end of their early-century excellence. They brought in Bonzi Wells as a one-year stopgap at shooting guard to replace free-agent escapee Cuttino Mobley, added Shareef Abdur-Rahim with the midlevel exception, and gambled that their thin bench wouldn't be exposed.
Unfortunately, Abdur-Rahim was limited by a broken jaw, Peja Stojakovic and Miller started showing their age, and Wells missed 30 games. The only positive development to offset those disappointments was the emergence of a shooting guard, Martin, who had done nothing as a rookie but sported one of the league's top true shooting percentage marks in his sophomore campaign. As a result, the Kings seemed a tired, old team, with a glaring lack of athleticism and a profound inability to stop opponents. As the trade deadline neared they were mired at 19-27 and it seemed their string of playoff appearances was coming to an end.
With things looking down, the Kings took the ultimate gamble -- they traded for Ron Artest. The mercurial forward had worn out his welcome in Indiana, but Sacramento figured his combo of defense and toughness was exactly what it needed. The Kings sent Stojakovic, a free-agent-to-be, to the Pacers in a deal that really had limited risk for Sacramento -- it was either do this or blow up the team.
Artest immediately paid dividends, helping the Kings tidy up their defense. Sacramento roared to a 25-11 finish and captured the West's final playoff spot, then took two games off San Antonio before bowing out in the postseason. Sacramento went from giving up 99.9 points per game before the trade to 94.0 afterward, and their opponent field-goal percentage dropped from 45.9 percent to 44.7 percent.
That said, the win-loss record exaggerates the extent of the improvement. Though Sacramento began the year 19-27, it was also extremely unlucky, having given up only 0.4 points per game more than it allowed. Second, the later half of the Kings' schedule was much kinder -- 21 of their final 36 games were in the friendly confines of Arco Arena. And that six-game series against San Antonio? It included losses by 11, 22 and 34 points. Over the six games, they were outscored by 57 points.
For the season, Sacramento ranked almost as high at the defensive end (13th in defensive efficiency) as it did offensively (11th). While Artest was a major reason, a lot of credit also has to go to Rick Adelman. Despite his lame-duck status, he was able to get solid defensive efforts from an undermanned frontcourt and one of the league's least athletic lineups.
Offensively, it was hard to believe this was still the Kings. Instead of the running-and-gunning, long-range bombing teams of yore, this was a halfcourt outfit that liked to pound it inside. Sacramento's offense after the trade was completely inverted -- wingmen Wells and Artest would be posting up while big guys like Miller and Kenny Thomas hung around on the perimeter. But it was effective, despite some very disappointing shooting numbers from Artest (38.3 percent after the trade).
Sacramento also had its share of off-court drama, as the continuing battle between the city and the owners over a new arena has cast doubt on whether the team will remain in town. Owners Joe and Gavin Maloof have strong Las Vegas ties and the NBA seems to be thawing its stance toward putting a team there (to the delight of countless media members, the city already has been awarded this year's All-Star Game), so it's not too hard to connect the dots. It would be a shame considering the crowd support the team gets -- Sacramento has 313 consecutive home sellouts -- but there's no doubting that Arco Arena is outdated.
OFFSEASON MOVES
Kings GM Geoff Petrie has thrived over the past decade by staying a step ahead of the competition. This summer wasn't one of his better ones, though, with the lone major personnel move likely leaving the team much worse off.
• Fired Rick Adelman, hired Eric Musselman. After nine years in Sacramento, it wasn't easy to part with Adelman. One of the more underrated coaches of the past two decades, he's taken a lot of heat for his team's playoff failures. But few coaches have been better at maintaining cohesion, or picking out his seven guys at the start of the season and sticking to that rotation all season. One could argue his message was getting stale, but how stale could it have been to the 10 new players on the roster? It seems the real problem was that the owners were tired of the coach, not the players.
Fortunately, Adelman's replacement is a solid choice. Musselman did creditable work in his previous gig at Golden State, and since that was his first NBA head coaching job one hopes he learned plenty as well. He doesn't have an easy mandate in trying to coax an aging team with a volatile star back into the postseason, and it will be harder because both the Kings and their fans are used to making the playoffs and will blame him if they don't.
• Signed John Salmons, let Wells leave. Letting Wells go was the easy part. He supposedly was asking for $10 million a year, even after everyone else ran out of cap space and he had no leverage, so at some point the Kings had to move on. Even without the contract demands, I would have let Wells walk. I know he and Musselman are tight, but isn't having Wells and Artest in the same clubhouse a bit like lighting a cigarette at a gas station?
However, the decision to go after Salmons looks fishy. The Kings gave a five-year, $25 million deal to a guy whose production in Philadelphia was positively piddling. While Kings' fans will point out that two other teams -- Toronto and Phoenix -- clamored to give him a similar deal, the cold reality is that Salmons isn't particularly young (he turns 27 in December), hasn't played particularly effectively (he ranked 46th out of 58 shooting guards in player efficiency rating), and wasn't the best player available (for instance, J.R. Smith and Kirk Snyder could have been had just by asking nicely). Petrie rarely screws up a personnel decision, but this one sure seemed like a panic move.
• Signed Loren Woods. Woods found the only team that's thinner than he is. For most teams, I wouldn't even mention this pick-up, but Sacramento has so few bench options that Woods might need to play regularly so it warrants a few lines. The competition between him and Vitaly Potapenko for the backup center job promises to be the NBA's least-exciting training camp battle.
• Drafted Quincy Douby. A late first-round pick, Douby is another guy who probably will have to play right away because the Kings are so thin. He's a shoot-first, Eddie House type who will play both guard spots, but he'll probably play more at the point since the other contender, Jason Hart, had such a miserable campaign a year ago.
BIGGEST STRENGTH
Ballhandling. This always has been a Kings' strength and should again this year. From top to bottom, nearly every important player on this team is an above-average dribbler and passer for his size, and historically that's made the Kings very difficult to defend. Start with Miller, one of the best passing big men in the game and a deft left-handed driver despite his lack of speed. Thomas and Abdur-Rahim also handle the ball very well for their size, with Thomas comfortable playing out high and Abdur-Rahim even pushing it out on the break on occasion.
On the perimeter there's more where that came from. Artest, Francisco Garcia and Salmons all can handle the ball like a point guard, so much so that the Kings probably won't even play the man who is theoretically Bibby's backup (Hart). Artest played point forward on several occasions after the trade last season, while Salmons' primary asset as a player is his ability to handle the ball at 6-7. The only weak ballhandler among the rotation players is Martin.
BIGGEST WEAKNESS
Frontcourt size and depth. Um, these guys know they only have three big men …right? I mean, I'm as glass-half-full as the next guy, but this looks like a recipe for disaster. Miller began showing his age last season and doesn't figure to be any fresher after playing for the U.S. national team all summer. Abdur-Rahim has missed time with injuries each of the past two years, and Thomas is no stranger to the trainer's room either.
Moreover, none of the three can give the team the interior presence it so desperately needs at the defensive end. Miller is a high-skill guy but has no elevation and little quickness, while Abdur-Rahim and Thomas both are small for power forwards -- let alone the center spot.
As a result, we could be looking at some serious ugliness coming off the Sacramento bench. Between Woods, Potapenko, and Corliss Williamson, at least one and probably two players will have to play significant minutes. If they're as bad as I expect, it's going to put a major dent in the Kings' win total.
2006-07 OUTLOOK
Because of the strong finish, a lot of people are expecting big things from the Kings this year. Don't count me as one of them. As I pointed out above, once you adjust for victory margin and home-road differential, the Kings' second-half surge wasn't quite as potent as it first seemed. Additionally, replacing a quality performer like Wells with a mediocrity like Salmons is bound to knock a few games off the Kings' record.
Losing Wells also hurts because the Kings are so lacking off the bench, with their best reserve a year ago (Martin) now forced to start. The frontcourt has obvious weaknesses, but the backcourt is no picnic either -- just to have a decent seven-man rotation would require either Salmons or Garcia to play much better than a year ago, or Douby to hit the ground running.
Then there's the other question -- who on this team will be better than last year? Bibby is 28, Thomas and Abdur-Rahim are 29, and Miller is 30. Martin is younger but his true shooting percentage from a year ago looks decidedly fluky, so any improvements in his game this year might be offset by fewer shots finding the net. One hopes Artest will play better than he did after the trade last season, but the only King one could predict improvement from with much confidence is Garcia -- and he needs to improve just to be a decent bench player.
All told, I'm not sure Musselman realizes quite how difficult the task before him is. Sacramento can make a playoff run if nobody gets hurt in the frontcourt and Artest and Bibby perform near the top of their range, but everybody in the West can make an argument along those lines. The most likely scenario is that they limp home a couple games short of .500, and a couple games short of a playoff spot.
