Iraq needs a strongman. Allawi is waiting
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - For four years, former Iraqi prime minister Iyad Allawi has been a voice of reason in Iraq. He always stood out against religiously driven Shi'ite hegemony over Iraqi politics, although he himself is Shi'ite (but a secular one) and has refused the partitioning of Iraq and the sidelining of Iraqi Sunnis after the downfall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Sunnis need to be given a bigger and more realistic and proportionate role in the new Iraq, he argues. An autonomous Shi'ite district in the south, something coveted by many fellow Shi'ites, is non-negotiable. He is in favor of strengthening Iraq's ties to the Arab world, has strong friendships with numerous Arab heads of state, and categorically opposes militia rule, which has become widespread during the reign of the two prime ministers who succeeded him in office, Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nuri al-Maliki.
Allawi makes no secret his ties to the United States, unlike Maliki, who speaks anti-Americanism at home, but cuddles up to the Americans at every opportunity. For some time now, Allawi has been silent, seeing a slim chance in making a comeback to the premiership, given the unconditional support Maliki has received from the US.
Maliki's good days, however, are nearly finished, as his relationship with the US administration strains. Sources at Maliki's office said last week that officials at the US Embassy in Baghdad had given him an early-June deadline to get his act together, or be ejected from office if he does not bring substantial security to Iraq.
Not only has Maliki's era given the Americans a bad name, he has repeatedly backed out on his promises, and refused to disarm the militias, either because they were allied to him (as is the case with the Mehdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr) or to Iran (such as the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, SCIRI).
An Iraq with Shi'ite militias is safer as far as Maliki is concerned than an Iraq with no Shi'ite militias and only Sunni ones. Allawi sees only one future for Iraq: an Iraq with no militias. Period. He does not tolerate armed violence and believes that the US occupation will not end through armed resistance.
There was talk last April of a US-backed coup in Baghdad, to oust then-prime minister Jaafari and the Iran-backed Shi'ite team that supported him (the United Iraqi Alliance that still backs his successor Maliki). Allawi, who holds 25 of the 275 seats in Parliament, would return as prime minister.
This coup, it was believed back then, was the product of a conviction that Iraq was not ready for democracy in 2003. The new system only led to chaos and sectarianism. The only solution was to replace the existing regime with a strong central government, one that cared more so for security and the rule of law than such trappings of democracy as a free press and parliamentary elections. The rumored coup of 2006 was a military one, to be carried out by pro-US elements in Iraq.
That ambitions idea was dismissed as nonsense back then. It resurfaces today as not a military coup, but a political one, chaired by none other than Allawi. He recently returned from a trip to regional Arab countries, all allies of the US, headed by Sunni regimes that are opposed to Iraq becoming a puppet state for the Iranians. They included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan. He sold them his vision for a new Iraq.
His fans argue that although a coup is undemocratic, Allawi's motto, when returning to office, would be "security first, democracy second".
Allawi has several serious obstacles at making a comeback to office. Prime on the list is that he does not have a parliamentary majority, and in a country torn apart by sectarianism, he does not enjoy a wide power base because of his secular views. His constant criticism of the new government, describing it as a thinly disguised theocracy, almost like the one in Iran, has created many enemies for him in Baghdad, especially within the Shi'ite community.
The Sunnis support him, however, and so do the Kurds. Last week, he spoke to the Associated Press and heated up his campaign against Maliki, saying that the Baghdad Security Plan of February had not been successful. "It seems to me even the surge, unfortunately, is not working efficiently yet," Allawi said. He added, "Security, as you can see, is still deteriorating in the country and sectarianism is unfortunately prevailing. We are witnessing wide-scale atrocities throughout the country."
The reasons for Iraq's plight, he said, can be found in its current prime minister. He criticized Maliki for refusing, despite rhetoric, to conduct serious talks with Iraqi Sunnis. Precisely because of Maliki's hostility to the Sunnis, whom he blames for the wrongdoings of Saddam's era, the Baghdad Security Plan "is not going to succeed", said Allawi.
He described the Shi'ite-dominated government and Parliament as "biased and sectarian-based", claiming they were damaging the country. He explained his future vision this way: "I'm definitely trying to pull together an alliance of moderates in Iraq. I strongly believe that sectarianism and terrorism are both signs of extremism. And really what we need in Iraq, as well as the region, is the creation of moderate camps."
The solutions for Allawi are, simply, the fall of the government and the resignation of Parliament. This would have to be done on orders from the United States, and Maliki's team would be replaced with a cabinet of national unity (headed by Allawi) that would restore order and disarm the militias. Last year, speaking to the London-based daily Al-Hayat, Allawi said a US-style democracy was not applicable to Iraq.
He said: "One cannot bring American democracy to a country that is occupied like Iraq, and whose infrastructure, as well as military and governmental institutions, have been destroyed." He added, "I warned the Americans repeatedly [against] trying to model Iraq on the social and administrative system in the United States."
Allawi was saying that a military coup was not desirable, but neither was the chaos existing in Iraq today. The chaos under Jaafari, he said, "where the government turned a blind eye to the militias ... has led Iraq to a disaster". This week he elaborated, saying: "I always thought that the first steps toward democracy were not to have elections. The first steps are [to create] the rule of law and a bill of rights for the people. That would pave the way for full-blown democracy."
Taking action
Following his words up with actions, Allawi secured the resignation over the weekend of one of his ministers from the Maliki cabinet, Hashem al-Shibli, the minister of justice. This is the first sign of rupture in the cabinet of Prime Minister Maliki since it assumed office last May.
Contradictory signs are coming out of Baghdad regarding the reasons for his resignation. Some claim it is a preemptive move, since Shibli knew that Maliki was planning a reshuffle and would not include him in the new cabinet. He stepped down before being retired from his job.
Others, however, attribute his resignation to disagreements between Maliki and Allawi, who heads Shibli's political party, the Iraqi List. Still others claim that the disagreement was personal, between Maliki and Shibli. The two men came to blows last December during the execution of Saddam Hussein. Shibli, who is a Sunni Arab, had many reservations about the execution.
First, being minister of justice, he had doubts about its legality, since it was not approved by the president. Not only did it embarrass him within the Sunni community, for failing to protect their leader, but it also strained his relationship with the Shi'ite majority in power. Shibli, like most Sunni Arabs, claimed that the execution was carried out in a gangster-like manner, with masked men and chants in favor of Muqtada al-Sadr, both of which represented anything but officialdom.
A better explanation to the sudden resignation would be a combination of above. It certainly could not have been done, however, without Allawi's blessing.
Coinciding with Allawi's coup were increasing signs of discontent within the Sunni community of Iraq, which is allied to the former prime minister. Last week, members of the police, being militiamen under cover, went on a homicidal rampage in the Sunni neighborhood of Tal Afar, killing more than 70 civilians. For two hours they roamed the streets of the city, arresting Sunnis, handcuffing them, and shooting them through the head. Angry Sunnis have demanded a trial of the police officers, and the resignation of Maliki.
The sectarian attacks were in response to car bombs last Tuesday that killed more than 60 Shi'ites and wounded more than 300, also in Tal Afar. Investigations identified 18 police officers as architects of the massacre. After arresting them, government authorities surprisingly had them released. That could not have been done without the blessing of Maliki.
The government claimed that the police officers had been released to attend the funeral of their relatives who had been killed in the car bombs against the Shi'ite districts on March 27. To calm down anger, Maliki ordered their arrest once again. On Thursday, suicide bombers responded to the Tal Afar bombing by attacking a Shi'ite district in the Iraqi capital, killing 130 people. Most of the victims were women and children, since the bombing took place in a shopping area.
The Ministry of Health, run by Sadrists loyal to the government, commented saying: "It is impossible to tell the exact number of dead because we are basically counting body parts." While the government was "counting the dead", three suicide bombs went off within minutes of one another at Khalis, 80 kilometers north of Baghdad, killing 53 and wounding more than 100.
Sad as these events may be, they fit nicely into Allawi's campaign, which will concentrate, in the upcoming two months, on discrediting Maliki in every possible way.
One way is to remind the world of Allawi's virtues, without directly comparing them with Maliki's but letting facts speak for themselves. While the Iraqis watch in horror what is taking place in Tal Afar today, they are asked to remember what happened in Fallujah and Najaf in 2004, when the Allawi cabinet cracked down on the Mehdi Army. Allawi personally supervised the military operations and hit them with force, regardless of sect or objective, saying they were disrupting peace in Iraq.
In many ways, Allawi resembles Michel Aoun, the Lebanese Christian leader who is striving to become president. Both Allawi and Aoun are obsessed with returning to power and have grand, non-sectarian agendas for their countrymen. Allawi, wanting to prove his credentials as an Iraqi nationalist, and not just a Shi'ite leader, was the first to strike the Iraqi Shi'ites in 2004. Likewise, Aoun did the same with Lebanon's Christians in the late 1980s during the civil war. Both men are striving to become leaders not of their respective communities, but rather of their respective countries.
True, Aoun has lost support from onetime loyal and radical Christians, and so has Allawi among Shi'ites. But they don't want to be remembered as a Shi'ite leader, or a Christian leader. What is amazing is the amount of support these two men enjoy within their constituency, giving them great room for political maneuvering.
Aoun and Allawi do not come from traditional political families - they have not inherited their leadership roles. They are not directly supported by a certain country, whether Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia or the United States. And yet their supporters love them and want to help them reach their leadership roles in Baghdad and Beirut. No alliance is taboo to achieving that.
Aoun allied himself with unimaginable allies, the Iran-backed Hezbollah, while Allawi has cuddled up to numerous figures, including the Tawafok parliamentary bloc, which holds 44 seats, and is flirting with the Fadila Party, which was a member of the United Iraqi Alliance but broke away last month to oppose the UIA's sectarianism. He has made goodwill visits to numerous Sunni politicians and, more recently, started to court the Kurds as well. One way was to support their claims for Kirkuk becoming part of Iraqi Kurdistan. That is a price Allawi is willing to pay to strengthen his power base at home.
A short while ago, the former prime minister visited Kurdistan and met with its president, Masoud al-Barazani. He asked that Barazani join the anti-Maliki team, but the latter refused to commit himself, in fear of embarrassing his friend and ally Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president, who is also a Kurd. With his bloc, topped with Kurdish support, and al-Fadila, Allawi hopes he can secure 140 seats in Parliament - enough to bring down Maliki constitutionally.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst and the managing editor of Forward magazine.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - For four years, former Iraqi prime minister Iyad Allawi has been a voice of reason in Iraq. He always stood out against religiously driven Shi'ite hegemony over Iraqi politics, although he himself is Shi'ite (but a secular one) and has refused the partitioning of Iraq and the sidelining of Iraqi Sunnis after the downfall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Sunnis need to be given a bigger and more realistic and proportionate role in the new Iraq, he argues. An autonomous Shi'ite district in the south, something coveted by many fellow Shi'ites, is non-negotiable. He is in favor of strengthening Iraq's ties to the Arab world, has strong friendships with numerous Arab heads of state, and categorically opposes militia rule, which has become widespread during the reign of the two prime ministers who succeeded him in office, Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nuri al-Maliki.
Allawi makes no secret his ties to the United States, unlike Maliki, who speaks anti-Americanism at home, but cuddles up to the Americans at every opportunity. For some time now, Allawi has been silent, seeing a slim chance in making a comeback to the premiership, given the unconditional support Maliki has received from the US.
Maliki's good days, however, are nearly finished, as his relationship with the US administration strains. Sources at Maliki's office said last week that officials at the US Embassy in Baghdad had given him an early-June deadline to get his act together, or be ejected from office if he does not bring substantial security to Iraq.
Not only has Maliki's era given the Americans a bad name, he has repeatedly backed out on his promises, and refused to disarm the militias, either because they were allied to him (as is the case with the Mehdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr) or to Iran (such as the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, SCIRI).
An Iraq with Shi'ite militias is safer as far as Maliki is concerned than an Iraq with no Shi'ite militias and only Sunni ones. Allawi sees only one future for Iraq: an Iraq with no militias. Period. He does not tolerate armed violence and believes that the US occupation will not end through armed resistance.
There was talk last April of a US-backed coup in Baghdad, to oust then-prime minister Jaafari and the Iran-backed Shi'ite team that supported him (the United Iraqi Alliance that still backs his successor Maliki). Allawi, who holds 25 of the 275 seats in Parliament, would return as prime minister.
This coup, it was believed back then, was the product of a conviction that Iraq was not ready for democracy in 2003. The new system only led to chaos and sectarianism. The only solution was to replace the existing regime with a strong central government, one that cared more so for security and the rule of law than such trappings of democracy as a free press and parliamentary elections. The rumored coup of 2006 was a military one, to be carried out by pro-US elements in Iraq.
That ambitions idea was dismissed as nonsense back then. It resurfaces today as not a military coup, but a political one, chaired by none other than Allawi. He recently returned from a trip to regional Arab countries, all allies of the US, headed by Sunni regimes that are opposed to Iraq becoming a puppet state for the Iranians. They included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan. He sold them his vision for a new Iraq.
His fans argue that although a coup is undemocratic, Allawi's motto, when returning to office, would be "security first, democracy second".
Allawi has several serious obstacles at making a comeback to office. Prime on the list is that he does not have a parliamentary majority, and in a country torn apart by sectarianism, he does not enjoy a wide power base because of his secular views. His constant criticism of the new government, describing it as a thinly disguised theocracy, almost like the one in Iran, has created many enemies for him in Baghdad, especially within the Shi'ite community.
The Sunnis support him, however, and so do the Kurds. Last week, he spoke to the Associated Press and heated up his campaign against Maliki, saying that the Baghdad Security Plan of February had not been successful. "It seems to me even the surge, unfortunately, is not working efficiently yet," Allawi said. He added, "Security, as you can see, is still deteriorating in the country and sectarianism is unfortunately prevailing. We are witnessing wide-scale atrocities throughout the country."
The reasons for Iraq's plight, he said, can be found in its current prime minister. He criticized Maliki for refusing, despite rhetoric, to conduct serious talks with Iraqi Sunnis. Precisely because of Maliki's hostility to the Sunnis, whom he blames for the wrongdoings of Saddam's era, the Baghdad Security Plan "is not going to succeed", said Allawi.
He described the Shi'ite-dominated government and Parliament as "biased and sectarian-based", claiming they were damaging the country. He explained his future vision this way: "I'm definitely trying to pull together an alliance of moderates in Iraq. I strongly believe that sectarianism and terrorism are both signs of extremism. And really what we need in Iraq, as well as the region, is the creation of moderate camps."
The solutions for Allawi are, simply, the fall of the government and the resignation of Parliament. This would have to be done on orders from the United States, and Maliki's team would be replaced with a cabinet of national unity (headed by Allawi) that would restore order and disarm the militias. Last year, speaking to the London-based daily Al-Hayat, Allawi said a US-style democracy was not applicable to Iraq.
He said: "One cannot bring American democracy to a country that is occupied like Iraq, and whose infrastructure, as well as military and governmental institutions, have been destroyed." He added, "I warned the Americans repeatedly [against] trying to model Iraq on the social and administrative system in the United States."
Allawi was saying that a military coup was not desirable, but neither was the chaos existing in Iraq today. The chaos under Jaafari, he said, "where the government turned a blind eye to the militias ... has led Iraq to a disaster". This week he elaborated, saying: "I always thought that the first steps toward democracy were not to have elections. The first steps are [to create] the rule of law and a bill of rights for the people. That would pave the way for full-blown democracy."
Taking action
Following his words up with actions, Allawi secured the resignation over the weekend of one of his ministers from the Maliki cabinet, Hashem al-Shibli, the minister of justice. This is the first sign of rupture in the cabinet of Prime Minister Maliki since it assumed office last May.
Contradictory signs are coming out of Baghdad regarding the reasons for his resignation. Some claim it is a preemptive move, since Shibli knew that Maliki was planning a reshuffle and would not include him in the new cabinet. He stepped down before being retired from his job.
Others, however, attribute his resignation to disagreements between Maliki and Allawi, who heads Shibli's political party, the Iraqi List. Still others claim that the disagreement was personal, between Maliki and Shibli. The two men came to blows last December during the execution of Saddam Hussein. Shibli, who is a Sunni Arab, had many reservations about the execution.
First, being minister of justice, he had doubts about its legality, since it was not approved by the president. Not only did it embarrass him within the Sunni community, for failing to protect their leader, but it also strained his relationship with the Shi'ite majority in power. Shibli, like most Sunni Arabs, claimed that the execution was carried out in a gangster-like manner, with masked men and chants in favor of Muqtada al-Sadr, both of which represented anything but officialdom.
A better explanation to the sudden resignation would be a combination of above. It certainly could not have been done, however, without Allawi's blessing.
Coinciding with Allawi's coup were increasing signs of discontent within the Sunni community of Iraq, which is allied to the former prime minister. Last week, members of the police, being militiamen under cover, went on a homicidal rampage in the Sunni neighborhood of Tal Afar, killing more than 70 civilians. For two hours they roamed the streets of the city, arresting Sunnis, handcuffing them, and shooting them through the head. Angry Sunnis have demanded a trial of the police officers, and the resignation of Maliki.
The sectarian attacks were in response to car bombs last Tuesday that killed more than 60 Shi'ites and wounded more than 300, also in Tal Afar. Investigations identified 18 police officers as architects of the massacre. After arresting them, government authorities surprisingly had them released. That could not have been done without the blessing of Maliki.
The government claimed that the police officers had been released to attend the funeral of their relatives who had been killed in the car bombs against the Shi'ite districts on March 27. To calm down anger, Maliki ordered their arrest once again. On Thursday, suicide bombers responded to the Tal Afar bombing by attacking a Shi'ite district in the Iraqi capital, killing 130 people. Most of the victims were women and children, since the bombing took place in a shopping area.
The Ministry of Health, run by Sadrists loyal to the government, commented saying: "It is impossible to tell the exact number of dead because we are basically counting body parts." While the government was "counting the dead", three suicide bombs went off within minutes of one another at Khalis, 80 kilometers north of Baghdad, killing 53 and wounding more than 100.
Sad as these events may be, they fit nicely into Allawi's campaign, which will concentrate, in the upcoming two months, on discrediting Maliki in every possible way.
One way is to remind the world of Allawi's virtues, without directly comparing them with Maliki's but letting facts speak for themselves. While the Iraqis watch in horror what is taking place in Tal Afar today, they are asked to remember what happened in Fallujah and Najaf in 2004, when the Allawi cabinet cracked down on the Mehdi Army. Allawi personally supervised the military operations and hit them with force, regardless of sect or objective, saying they were disrupting peace in Iraq.
In many ways, Allawi resembles Michel Aoun, the Lebanese Christian leader who is striving to become president. Both Allawi and Aoun are obsessed with returning to power and have grand, non-sectarian agendas for their countrymen. Allawi, wanting to prove his credentials as an Iraqi nationalist, and not just a Shi'ite leader, was the first to strike the Iraqi Shi'ites in 2004. Likewise, Aoun did the same with Lebanon's Christians in the late 1980s during the civil war. Both men are striving to become leaders not of their respective communities, but rather of their respective countries.
True, Aoun has lost support from onetime loyal and radical Christians, and so has Allawi among Shi'ites. But they don't want to be remembered as a Shi'ite leader, or a Christian leader. What is amazing is the amount of support these two men enjoy within their constituency, giving them great room for political maneuvering.
Aoun and Allawi do not come from traditional political families - they have not inherited their leadership roles. They are not directly supported by a certain country, whether Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia or the United States. And yet their supporters love them and want to help them reach their leadership roles in Baghdad and Beirut. No alliance is taboo to achieving that.
Aoun allied himself with unimaginable allies, the Iran-backed Hezbollah, while Allawi has cuddled up to numerous figures, including the Tawafok parliamentary bloc, which holds 44 seats, and is flirting with the Fadila Party, which was a member of the United Iraqi Alliance but broke away last month to oppose the UIA's sectarianism. He has made goodwill visits to numerous Sunni politicians and, more recently, started to court the Kurds as well. One way was to support their claims for Kirkuk becoming part of Iraqi Kurdistan. That is a price Allawi is willing to pay to strengthen his power base at home.
A short while ago, the former prime minister visited Kurdistan and met with its president, Masoud al-Barazani. He asked that Barazani join the anti-Maliki team, but the latter refused to commit himself, in fear of embarrassing his friend and ally Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president, who is also a Kurd. With his bloc, topped with Kurdish support, and al-Fadila, Allawi hopes he can secure 140 seats in Parliament - enough to bring down Maliki constitutionally.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst and the managing editor of Forward magazine.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)