THE OFFICIAL GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS 2009 OFFSEASON THREAD
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D.R.A.F.T. Initiative: The Warriors' wayGolden State has a strong draft record, but most of the team's picks succeed elsewhere By Ric Bucher
The NBA teams that have drafted well over the past 20 years and won because of it have several common traits: a definitive style of play, a stable front office and patient ownership.
The Golden State Warriors offer evidence of what you get when only a definitive style of play prevails. First of all, there isn't that much winning, no matter how exciting the style. The draft becomes a particularly painful device, because it evolves into a Groundhog Day horror show. An unheralded player is taken and almost immediately achieves sleeper status for a surprisingly robust rookie campaign. Said player is gone after a couple of years, by free agency or trade. Another gem is unearthed. He, too, slips away, spending his most successful years elsewhere. And so on. The result is almost cruel for its fan base: Five former Warriors played in the 1997 All-Star game. Four of them -- Mitch Richmond, Latrell Sprewell, Tim Hardaway and Chris Webber -- had been drafted by Golden State. Actual Warriors All-Stars gained from dealing the five?
None.
And that's how you end up with a franchise that gets an above-average grade in the D.R.A.F.T. Initiative study (a C-plus, 11th in the league), yet misses the playoffs 15 times in those 20 seasons. The Warriors' draftees have outperformed the expected estimated wins added (EWA) for their draft slot by an average of 0.06 wins per pick. They've just accomplished most of that elsewhere.
At least give the organization this: It knows which dangling carrot keeps the fans coming back. While the Warriors have had four GMs over the past 20 years -- actually five, since P.J. Carlesimo had personnel authority when he was first hired as coach in 1995 -- their style of play has been largely the same. Don Nelson's up-tempo, high-scoring philosophy became an instant hit when, as GM, he appointed himself head coach in 1988, right before the D.R.A.F.T. Initiative study begins. After six-plus seasons, the fan base wanted to see something more than a regular-season speedboat that habitually ran aground after a round or two in the playoffs, so Nelson left. That led to a 3½-season dalliance with a more defensive-oriented style under GM Dave Twardzik and coaches Carlesimo and then Rick Adelman, before owner Chris Cohan tried to revive the Nelson style by hiring his former assistant coach, Garry St. Jean, as GM, who was succeeded by former Nelson draft pick, Chris Mullin.
The problem, of course, is that they hired neophyte coaches -- Dave Cowens, Eric Musselman, Mike Montgomery -- who couldn't make Nellyball work better than its master. But there was always enough young talent to believe better days were just around the corner.
That historical synopsis helps explain how a team could find such diamonds in the second-round rough as Gilbert Arenas and Monta Ellis, select six future All-Stars and only have five playoff appearances in 20 years to show for it. In short, they've rolled the dice on a number of explosive players with red-flagged backgrounds and without a defined position and struck gold on a couple. Good or bad, they don't stick around.
The Timberwolves, for comparison's sake, have a much worse draft record in the D.R.A.F.T. Initiative analysis (-0.13 EWA per pick, good for a C-minus grade), have selected only four future All-Stars and yet have eight playoff appearances over the same stretch. The biggest difference? Minnesota landed Kevin Garnett with the fifth pick in 1995 and stubbornly built around him for 12 seasons. The Warriors traded Webber away after one season, let Arenas escape after two and have not had a player drafted in the last 20 years stay beyond Hardaway's seven seasons, which includes a full year missed with a knee injury.
"It shows that all of us can become impatient," says one GM of the Warriors' penchant for identifying great talent and then losing it. "We want success overnight. Sometimes it takes a whole career to measure a player's worth. Not every team is willing to wait that long to find out."
The Warriors have had a particularly hard time standing pat. The blame ultimately lands on owner Cohan, who bought controlling interest in the team in 1994 and has presided over nine coaching changes in 15 seasons.
But it also points to the danger of having one man, Nelson, as GM and coach, roles he jointly held from 1988 to 1995. He's not the first coach eager to get rid of a player he doesn't like -- Larry Brown has an equally quick trigger -- but Brown has been saved from his impulses by a string of strong GMs. Nelson has worked for only one with the Warriors, Mullin, whose authority was effectively negated when the team signed Nelson to a two-year extension last fall and made Mullin a lame duck this past season.
Sometimes All-Star berths and statistics can inflate a draft record, too, and the Warriors probably have some of that working for them. Another GM offered Anthony Morrow as an extreme example of how Nelson's system can create false value. Morrow, the GM said, could not play for most teams in the league because he is a poor wing defender and a subpar ball handler who would not get the necessary shots to compensate for the points he gives up on another team. Yet Morrow averaged eight shots, 10 points and 22 minutes a night for the Warriors, staggering numbers for an undrafted rookie, the third undrafted player included in the team's rotation in the past three years.
"They gave him confidence and made something out of him," the GM says. "But put him out on the open market and most teams would still be afraid to touch him. They're convinced he's the product of a system that made him look good. And it's a system that produces great individual numbers, not necessarily team success."
Which is just it. Despite Morrow's production, or No. 14 pick Anthony Randolph's eight double-doubles, his 7.9 ppg and 5.8 rpg in only 17.9 mpg and an EWA of 3.31 (already 0.91 ahead of the expected career average for his draft slot), the Warriors were 29-53. Meanwhile, sources say Nelson is more than willing to deal Ellis and has told Randolph he, too, might be better off somewhere else.
All of which means there's a good chance the Warriors are going to take a highly talented player with this year's seventh pick. After a year or two of surprisingly impressive play, he'll go elsewhere. On this prediction, Punxsutawney Phil's services aren't necessary.
The NBA teams that have drafted well over the past 20 years and won because of it have several common traits: a definitive style of play, a stable front office and patient ownership.
The Golden State Warriors offer evidence of what you get when only a definitive style of play prevails. First of all, there isn't that much winning, no matter how exciting the style. The draft becomes a particularly painful device, because it evolves into a Groundhog Day horror show. An unheralded player is taken and almost immediately achieves sleeper status for a surprisingly robust rookie campaign. Said player is gone after a couple of years, by free agency or trade. Another gem is unearthed. He, too, slips away, spending his most successful years elsewhere. And so on. The result is almost cruel for its fan base: Five former Warriors played in the 1997 All-Star game. Four of them -- Mitch Richmond, Latrell Sprewell, Tim Hardaway and Chris Webber -- had been drafted by Golden State. Actual Warriors All-Stars gained from dealing the five?
None.
And that's how you end up with a franchise that gets an above-average grade in the D.R.A.F.T. Initiative study (a C-plus, 11th in the league), yet misses the playoffs 15 times in those 20 seasons. The Warriors' draftees have outperformed the expected estimated wins added (EWA) for their draft slot by an average of 0.06 wins per pick. They've just accomplished most of that elsewhere.
At least give the organization this: It knows which dangling carrot keeps the fans coming back. While the Warriors have had four GMs over the past 20 years -- actually five, since P.J. Carlesimo had personnel authority when he was first hired as coach in 1995 -- their style of play has been largely the same. Don Nelson's up-tempo, high-scoring philosophy became an instant hit when, as GM, he appointed himself head coach in 1988, right before the D.R.A.F.T. Initiative study begins. After six-plus seasons, the fan base wanted to see something more than a regular-season speedboat that habitually ran aground after a round or two in the playoffs, so Nelson left. That led to a 3½-season dalliance with a more defensive-oriented style under GM Dave Twardzik and coaches Carlesimo and then Rick Adelman, before owner Chris Cohan tried to revive the Nelson style by hiring his former assistant coach, Garry St. Jean, as GM, who was succeeded by former Nelson draft pick, Chris Mullin.
The problem, of course, is that they hired neophyte coaches -- Dave Cowens, Eric Musselman, Mike Montgomery -- who couldn't make Nellyball work better than its master. But there was always enough young talent to believe better days were just around the corner.
That historical synopsis helps explain how a team could find such diamonds in the second-round rough as Gilbert Arenas and Monta Ellis, select six future All-Stars and only have five playoff appearances in 20 years to show for it. In short, they've rolled the dice on a number of explosive players with red-flagged backgrounds and without a defined position and struck gold on a couple. Good or bad, they don't stick around.
The Timberwolves, for comparison's sake, have a much worse draft record in the D.R.A.F.T. Initiative analysis (-0.13 EWA per pick, good for a C-minus grade), have selected only four future All-Stars and yet have eight playoff appearances over the same stretch. The biggest difference? Minnesota landed Kevin Garnett with the fifth pick in 1995 and stubbornly built around him for 12 seasons. The Warriors traded Webber away after one season, let Arenas escape after two and have not had a player drafted in the last 20 years stay beyond Hardaway's seven seasons, which includes a full year missed with a knee injury.
"It shows that all of us can become impatient," says one GM of the Warriors' penchant for identifying great talent and then losing it. "We want success overnight. Sometimes it takes a whole career to measure a player's worth. Not every team is willing to wait that long to find out."
The Warriors have had a particularly hard time standing pat. The blame ultimately lands on owner Cohan, who bought controlling interest in the team in 1994 and has presided over nine coaching changes in 15 seasons.
But it also points to the danger of having one man, Nelson, as GM and coach, roles he jointly held from 1988 to 1995. He's not the first coach eager to get rid of a player he doesn't like -- Larry Brown has an equally quick trigger -- but Brown has been saved from his impulses by a string of strong GMs. Nelson has worked for only one with the Warriors, Mullin, whose authority was effectively negated when the team signed Nelson to a two-year extension last fall and made Mullin a lame duck this past season.
Sometimes All-Star berths and statistics can inflate a draft record, too, and the Warriors probably have some of that working for them. Another GM offered Anthony Morrow as an extreme example of how Nelson's system can create false value. Morrow, the GM said, could not play for most teams in the league because he is a poor wing defender and a subpar ball handler who would not get the necessary shots to compensate for the points he gives up on another team. Yet Morrow averaged eight shots, 10 points and 22 minutes a night for the Warriors, staggering numbers for an undrafted rookie, the third undrafted player included in the team's rotation in the past three years.
"They gave him confidence and made something out of him," the GM says. "But put him out on the open market and most teams would still be afraid to touch him. They're convinced he's the product of a system that made him look good. And it's a system that produces great individual numbers, not necessarily team success."
Which is just it. Despite Morrow's production, or No. 14 pick Anthony Randolph's eight double-doubles, his 7.9 ppg and 5.8 rpg in only 17.9 mpg and an EWA of 3.31 (already 0.91 ahead of the expected career average for his draft slot), the Warriors were 29-53. Meanwhile, sources say Nelson is more than willing to deal Ellis and has told Randolph he, too, might be better off somewhere else.
All of which means there's a good chance the Warriors are going to take a highly talented player with this year's seventh pick. After a year or two of surprisingly impressive play, he'll go elsewhere. On this prediction, Punxsutawney Phil's services aren't necessary.
i would have to disagree. what gm would be afraid to add a 46% 3 point shooter. no system can improve a shooters shot that much. put him with any good big man that draws double teams and he will bury the 3. i dont disagree about his less than stellar D, although he improved somewhat by the end of the season.
BOTH ANTHONY RANDOLPH + MORROW FOCUSED FOR IMPROVEMENT
http://www.contracostatimes.com/sports/ci_12596651?source=rss
im still trippin how young Randolph really is. he's still growing and has room to gain more weight/muscle for improvement in his game. if he continues to work hard he will definitely become an allstar
http://www.contracostatimes.com/sports/ci_12596651?source=rss
im still trippin how young Randolph really is. he's still growing and has room to gain more weight/muscle for improvement in his game. if he continues to work hard he will definitely become an allstar
Monta Ellis - June 18th Warriors guard knbr interviewhttp://www.knbr.com/common/global_audio/201/8884.mp3
