AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER SADDAM, caps lock is teh ownz0r

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Jun 2, 2002
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pft, words and stuff by Kenneth M. Pollack



The Middle East is in a great deal of difficulty right now,
after Saddam Hussein and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Not only
do we have a mess in Iraq to fix, but there is an even
bigger mess out there in the larger Middle East. We're going
to need to deal with that mess, too, if we are going to be
able to defend our interests and our own security from the
threats we now face in the region.

The Arab states are broken. They are absolutely stagnant,
politically, economically, and socially. And their people
know it. Arabs are deeply angry and frustrated with the
situation they find themselves in because of the stagnation
of the Arab world. We hear about how angry the "Arab street"
is, but I don't think most people realize what is really
wrong in the Arab world.

EDUCATION
It all starts with education. Arab educational systems are
by and large very poor. The vast majority of Arab schools
don't teach anything useful to their students. They see
knowledge as a set body of facts that students are supposed
to memorize and simply regurgitate on set tests. And it's
always the same, there's no effort to bring out the
ingenuity, the creativity, of students.

These schools don't produce students who have useful job
skills. Most of the students specialize in humanities, many
of them aspire to be lawyers and Islamic scholars: two
thirds of all of the Ph.D.s issued in Saudi Arabia every
year are in Islamic studies. The scientists, engineers, and
computer programmers come to the U.S. because they can't get
a decent education in those sciences at home. So there's a
brain drain. The best and brightest leave their countries,
generally, and come here., where they contribute to our
economy and progress.

As a result, you have an enormous group of people in Egypt,
for instance, crop after crop of young, smart, educated
middle-class students coming out of Egyptian universities
who have degrees that have taught them nothing useful. No
one will hire them. You can imagine what it does to a bright
young person who believes that he should be part of that
country's elite when he can't even get a job because no one
has taught him anything useful.

It used to be the case that the Egyptian bureaucracy would
scoop all these young people up. It's one of the reasons you
have such bloated bureaucracies in the Arab world,
particularly in Egypt. But the demographics have gotten so
bad that even the massive Egyptian bureaucracy can no longer
soak up these enormous pools of smart, ambitious young
people.

LEGAL SYSTEM
The legal system in all the Arab countries is a disaster,
which is one reason so few American companies invest there,
except for the oil firms. In many of these countries rule of
law is meaningless. The law is entirely arbitrary.
Investment laws are set up to siphon money away from
multinationals and to the central government. No one can
count on what the central government is going to decide from
one moment to the next.

For example, there are nearly 500 princes in the Saudi royal
family, all of whom believe that they are entitled to live
like princes. Even the Saudi royal family can't accommodate
all of them, so the princes use their positions of power to
work around the legal system to make additional money.
They'll push a government contract to a certain place, or
they'll find out early where the government has decided to
build a school, a road, a bridge. Because Saudi Arabia is a
rather new country and was made up originally of a lot of
semi-literate Bedouins or recently settled townspeople, the
deed system in Saudi Arabia isn't terrific. The princes find
out where a new project is going to be built and have a deed
for the land drawn up. When the rightful owner comes forward
and takes the matter to court, the prince intercedes to get
the judge to rule in his favor.

ECONOMY
All of these different problems contribute to larger
economic problems. The economies of the Arab states are more
or less broken. They tend to fall into two categories.
For many years the oil states lived high off the hog. Even
to this day Kuwaitis and UAE are doing well, the Bahrainis
and Omanis are getting by, but the Saudis are having a real
problem because in the 1960s-70s, when they had massive oil
revenues, they created a cradle-to-grave welfare system. But
the decrease in global oil prices, coupled with a massive
rise in Saudi population, has reversed its affluence. Now,
the Saudis are running deficits. They can no longer live or
support their people the way they once did. But after 40
years of no one's having to work, there is almost no work
ethic left in Saudi Arabia.

The oil states are all decrepit command economies. In the
1950s and '60s, they put in place a form of socialism, but
they never ran it as well as the Soviets did. The Arab
states put it in place not because they necessarily thought
socialism was great, but because these kind of command
economies put all the economic resources of the state
tightly into the hands of the autocrats. It was another way
for them to control their societies. Today, they're paying
for it. None of them have industries that produce anything
that anyone wants to buy.

So some of the Gulf oil states are still doing reasonably
well, but the big state that matters, Saudi Arabia, is doing
very poorly. And for the rest of the Arab world, there
really isn't an economy to speak of. There isn't any kind of
a cash crop like oil that they can use to subsidize these
massive populations.

And of course all of this comes home to roost in the
political situation because the people of the region are
deeply frustrated. They understand that the rest of the
world has taken off with globalization, even places like
East Asia, which forty or fifty years ago was poor and worse
off than they were. How did East Asia go from being behind
them to being so far ahead of them? In every other part of
the world, even in Africa, they see states that seem to be
doing better than them. And they're deeply angry and
frustrated. They can't find jobs, they can't make a living,
and they've got no political recourse. Their governments
aren't interested in their problems. The governments just
feed them a steady diet of anti-Semitism and anti-
Americanism, creating an intellectual class that blames its
problems on us. The people are told that if they can't get a
job, it's "because we have to stay mobilized to go to war
against the Israelis." Or "it's because the Americans are
manipulating our economy."

The only alternative out there is even worse: the Islamists.
The Islamists at least stand up, and because they live in
the mosque, the states have been very wary of going after
them. The Islamists are willing to challenge the government.
They tell the people "We know how bad your lives are. We
know how unhappy you are. We have the answer: sharia. We
need to go back to the 12th century and recreate the Islamic
paradise that existed before the Mongols sacked Baghdad."

IRAQ
There's another important development going on out there,
and that's what's happening in Iraq, Iraq really matters,
for a variety of reasons.

First, if we get Iraq wrong and create a mess there, we will
create chaos in the entire region. Iraq is a very important
country. We've learned that if you allow a country to slide
into chaos, to become a failed state, that chaos never stays
within its borders. Remember Lebanon in the 1980s? The chaos
there destabilized Syria and Israel. Many of the problems
Israel has today stem from its involvement in Lebanon, which
it was basically drawn into because of the instability
there. Look at Afghanistan and how it destabilized Pakistan
and started to destabilize Iran and some of the Central
Asian states. Or the Congo. The Congo is a massive pit in
the middle of Africa. It is nothing but death and chaos, and
it has destabilized every single country around it.

And Iraq is important in and of itself, because it is the
source of the second largest proven oil reserves in the
world and because of the countries it borders: Turkey, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, and Jordan. If the chaos
spreads to them, things could get very unpleasant. A lot of
these states are tinderboxes right now. Saudi Arabia
probably isn't going to blow up tomorrow, but I wouldn't
make a bet as to whether it's still in its current state ten
years from now, if it continues down the same road that it's
been on for the last twenty years. And if it starts getting
a push from chaos in Iraq, things could unravel there much
faster.

In Jordan, there is the beloved King Abdullah. But King
Abdullah does not sit easily on his throne. He presides over
a population that's two thirds Palestinian, and those people
are very unhappy with their lot in life. And they would like
nothing better than to be able to control the levers of
power inside Jordan. Add Syria, Turkey and Iran, and there
aren't too many stable states neighboring Iraq.
 
Jun 2, 2002
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LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
But Iraq is also important because of this larger issue of
the region. Right now, there have traditionally been only
two visions out there in the Arab world. There's the vision
offered by the state autocrats, which basically says "Our
political system's fine. The only problem is the Americans
and Israelis. If Washington would just fix the peace
process, everything would be beautiful." The only voice of
opposition with any strength is the Islamists, who offer
their own vision of an alternative.

But in the last ten or fifteen years, another voice has been
developing in the Middle East. It's still very small and
weak, but it's the voice that we should all be supporting.
That's a group of liberal democratic Arabs who have been
standing up and saying "These two alternatives are both
equally bankrupt. Our choice should not be Mubarak's Egypt
or the Ayatollah's Iran. Why can't we do what 140, 150 other
countries around the world have done and start to
democratize, open up our economies, and build a free-market
economy and a democratic system? We can build a democratic
system that is perfectly compatible with Islam and with
traditional Arab values."

It's a small, still voice right now, and if we get Iraq
wrong, that voice is going to die. Because right now, as far
as the Arabs are concerned, what we're doing in Iraq is
embarking on a grand social-science experiment to try to
build a democratic free-market society in an Arab state.
Iraq is a pretty good Arab state. The Arabs know that the
Iraqi population is among the most secular, best educated,
most progressive, and most industrious in the Arab world.
The Arabs say, "If you want to try to build democracy
somewhere, Iraq is probably a pretty good place to try it."
If democracy fails in Iraq, it won't matter how we explain
why the effort failed. To the Arabs, all that will matter is
"The U.S. tried to build democracy and free-market economics
in Iraq, threw 130,000 troops and $100 billion at it, and
failed." And all the autocrats and all the Islamic
fundamentalists are going to say, "If the Americans couldn't
do it in Iraq, then it can't work anywhere in the Arab
world. So the only alternatives you have are us." That's a
lot at stake.

NATION-BUILDING
To get Iraq right requires us to do some hard things. We'll
have to bring in the international community in a way that
we haven't been willing to do yet. Not just its troops, but
the skills that we don't have. The last countries that we
tried to build as democracies, really, were Germany and
Japan (and Panama, of course, but that was a tiny and unique
case). Over the last 15 years, though, the UN, and
particularly the UN Development Program, has reached out to
a whole group of people who have embarked on these
enterprises in Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
East Timor. Not all of these were successes, but these
people were there doing it, and they learned and got better
each time they did it. They were stunned when they weren't
allowed to apply what they learned in Afghanistan. The same
has been true in Iraq. We need to reach out to the UN and
NGOs, who have the skills that we lack. They have Arabic
speakers, they have people who understand how to go out into
villages and teach people about democracy and organize them
and build from the ground up, which we've found is the best
way to do this.

We're also going to have to come to grips with our goals. We
hear every day that this administration is deeply divided
over what it wants in Iraq. One group believes in the idea
of nation-building, looks at the things that were done in
the 1980s and 1990s and says "We know how to do this. It's
going to be hard, but it can be done if you do it the right
way." Then another group says "Why bother? We got rid of the
bad guy, if the place falls into chaos, who cares?" Still
another group says "We've got our guy, his name is Ahmed
Chalaby, we're going to put him in charge. He'll be an SOB,
but he'll be our SOB."

These three groups fight over everything. Every decision
about Iraq comes down to this question of what kind of an
Iraq we want. This makes it impossible for the people out in
the field to figure out what they're doing on a day-to-day
basis. That's one of the reasons why Jerry Bremer has to
keep coming back to Washington, to try to force them to sort
this out. He's saying "I can do this. It'll be hard, it'll
cost us, but I know how to do this if you will let me."
Until Washington sorts itself out and lets him do it, I
don't think we're ever going to get there.

But the situation in Iraq is entirely salvageable. There is
a lot of good raw material in Iraq. Since we've been there
we've seen that there are a lot of positives. Our troops
have done a magnificent job. They went into Iraq, took over
the whole country, and basically after the fall of Baghdad
for about six weeks they sat on their hands, hoping that
somewhere there was a plan and someone who would tell them
what to do. After six weeks, they figured out like the rest
of us that there wasn't a plan. They rose to this and said
"OK, we'll do it ourselves."

And that's what they've been doing. They've been out there
making it up as they go: getting villages' water and power
turned on, forming councils. There have been tremendous
local successes all across Iraq, as both the soldiers and
the Iraqis will tell you. But we're not building on these,
because nobody in Baghdad or Washington has yet figured out
what to do. If we can build on the positive developments, if
we can get to a position where maybe five, ten or fifteen
years down the road Iraq is a stable pluralist state, then
you will start to see a lot of changes in the region.

It's not a matter of dominoes falling, it's something
somewhat different. For the first time ever Arabs will be
able to look at Iraq and see an Arab democracy. Often when
we say democracy, Arabs hear Britney Spears, sex on TV,
same-sex marriages and hip-hugger blue jeans. They know they
don't want any of that. But once you get that first
democracy formed in a region, it has a remarkable
transformative effect. This is what the East Asian
historians say about Japan. Fifteen, twenty years after the
occupation of Japan was over, when there was a functional
democracy in Japan, it changed a lot of perceptions
throughout East Asia. For the first time East Asians could
look at Japan and say "That's the kind of state that I could
imagine living in."

Before Japan, East Asians thought about democracy the same
way that Arabs do now. They thought of it as being an
American or a European thing. Those were the only examples
they had, and they knew they didn't want that. But then
Japan came along and proved that you could build a democracy
that was very different from a Western-style democracy. To
me, Japan is more dissimilar from our form of democracy than
Hosni Mubarak's Egypt is from our democracy. But it is a
functional democracy that is consistent with Japan's values,
traditions and history. And if we get it right in Iraq, for
the first time there will be a democratic Arab state with a
free-market economic system that will be consistent with
Arab values, traditions and history.

And once that is out there, those small, still voices in the
Arab world who are saying that there is an alternative will
be tremendously reinforced. This is the challenge we face.
In his speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on
November 6, President Bush said a lot of what I just said. I
hope he means it, though I'm a little skeptical at this
point in time. I've heard this speech from his
administration before. Richard Haass, then head of policy
planning, gave it in 2001, Colin Powell gave it in 2002, and
Condi Rice wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post this past
summer saying the exact same thing.

After each one of these speeches, the administration did
nothing. Arabs ask, "If you're really serious about
democracy, how about telling your friend Hosni Mubarak 'You
get $2.1 billion a year from us. Well, next year, unless you
start making some democratic changes, you're going to get
less. And if you do make those changes, you'll get more.'
And how about telling U.S. defense contractors, 'Next time
you want to get the Saudis to buy $4 billion worth of planes
that they won't be able to fly, you can't. Because we need
the Saudis to be able to put that money into their
educational system, not into another 60 F-15s that do
nothing but sit and bake in the sun.'" Until the president
is willing to make some hard diplomatic and economic choices
and tell the American people "I'm going to cut your tax
rebate because we need to increase our foreign aid budget
because we've got a real problem out there in the Middle
East," no one in the Middle East is going to take it
seriously. This isn't all abstract. This is stuff that comes
home to roost. These deeper economic and political problems
are what motivate the terrorists.
 
Jun 2, 2002
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TERRORISM
We know a lot about terrorist recruiting. Hezbollah goes
after the third and fourth and fifth sons of families in
Lebanon. These are youth who have no prospects. The first
son gets the land. The second son gets all the family's
clout to get him some kind of job in the army or the
bureaucracy. The third son has nothing: no education, no
skills, no land; he probably can't get married as a result
of all this. He is nothing but a burden on his family.
Hezbollah goes to those boys and says "We're going to give
you a chance. You martyr yourself for us, and we will take
care of your family forever. Forever we will be there
helping them economically. This is your chance to do
something for your family." And since there is nothing else
for these kids, a lot of them do take Hezbollah up on their
offer.

And we know a lot about how Al Qaeda recruits, too. It goes
after the intellectuals, the sons of the middle class, the
young men in Egypt who are smart, educated, well versed in
Islamic studies, who believe that they are entitled to a
decent job and a respectable life but can't get one because
of the poverty of their education, because of the crippling
corruption and poor legal systems in their societies. Al
Qaeda goes after them and says "We know who's responsible.
It's the Americans, the Mubarak regime, the Saudi regime. We
will help you take out your frustration on them. We have a
channel for your rage. Help us and we will overturn this
unjust system." The nineteen 9/11 hijackers weren't the poor
downtrodden, these were the sons of the middle class of
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And this is why the regions'
problems are more than just abstractions. You talk about
draining the swamp? This is what draining the swamp means.
 
Jul 24, 2002
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www.soundclick.com
#5

It's not a matter of dominoes falling, it's something
somewhat different. For the first time ever Arabs will be
able to look at Iraq and see an Arab democracy. Often when
we say democracy, Arabs hear Britney Spears, sex on TV,
same-sex marriages and hip-hugger blue jeans. They know they
don't want any of that. But once you get that first
democracy formed in a region, it has a remarkable
transformative effect. This is what the East Asian
historians say about Japan. Fifteen, twenty years after the
occupation of Japan was over, when there was a functional
democracy in Japan, it changed a lot of perceptions
throughout East Asia. For the first time East Asians could
look at Japan and say "That's the kind of state that I could
imagine living in."

Before Japan, East Asians thought about democracy the same
way that Arabs do now. They thought of it as being an
American or a European thing. Those were the only examples
they had, and they knew they didn't want that. But then
Japan came along and proved that you could build a democracy
that was very different from a Western-style democracy. To
me, Japan is more dissimilar from our form of democracy than
Hosni Mubarak's Egypt is from our democracy. But it is a
functional democracy that is consistent with Japan's values,
traditions and history. And if we get it right in Iraq, for
the first time there will be a democratic Arab state with a
free-market economic system that will be consistent with
Arab values, traditions and history.


I've been sayin this for a while now, this is the main reason why Bush went after Saddam. It wasn't for fear of WMD's and it wasn't necessarily for oil (all though takin Saddam out of power and oil in your pocket is a good perk).
America's agenda has always been to spread capitalism all over the world (in my opinion the first step to globalization) and Japan is a good example of that. Japan was the foundation for capitalism in Asia and now Iraq is going to set the tone for the Middle East....
 
Jul 7, 2002
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- What are the goals of the American existence in the Iraq and Middle East?

The primary goal, uncontroversially, is to control the immense energy reserves of the Persian Gulf region, Iraq included. That has been a prime concern of the Western industrial powers since the time when Iraq was created by the British, to ensure that Iraqi oil reserves would be in British hands and the newly-created state of Iraq would be barred from free access to the Gulf. At that time the US was not a leading actor in world affairs. But after World War II, the US was by far the dominant world power, and control of Middle East energy reserves became a leading foreign policy goal, as it had been for its predecessors. In the 1940s, US planners recognized that (in their words) Gulf energy resources are "a stupendous source of strategic power" and "one of the greatest material prizes in world history." Naturally, they intended to control it -- though for many years they did not make much use of it themselves, and in the future, according to US intelligence, the US itself will rely on more stable Atlantic Basin resources (West Africa and the Western hemisphere). Nevertheless, it remains a very high priority to control the Gulf resources, which are expected to provide 2/3 of world energy needs for some time to come. Quite apart from yielding "profits beyond the dreams of avarice," as one leading history of the oil industry puts the matter, the region still remains "a stupendous source of strategic power," a lever of world control. Control over Gulf energy reserves provides "veto power" over the actions of rivals, as the leading planner George Kennan pointed out half a century ago. Europe and Asia understand very well, and have long been seeking independent access to energy resources. Much of the jockeying for power in the Middle East and Central Asia has to do with these issues. The populations of the region are regarded as incidental, as long as they are passive and obedient. Few know this as well as the Kurds, at least if they remember their own history.
US planners surely intend to establish a client state in Iraq, with democratic forms if that is possible, if only for propaganda purposes. But Iraq is to be what the British, when they ran the region, called an "Arab facade," with British power in the background if the country seeks too much independence. That is a familiar part of the history of the region for the past century. It is also the way the US has run it's own domains in the Western hemisphere for a century. There is no indication whatsoever of any miraculous change. The US occupying forces have imposed on Iraq an economic program that no sovereign country would ever accept: it virtually guarantees that the Iraqi economy will be taken over by Western (mostly US) multinational corporations and banks. It is a policy that has been disastrous for the countries on which it has been imposed; in fact, such policies are a prime reason for the current sharp difference between today's wealthy countries and their former colonies. There is, of course, always a domestic sector that enriches itself by collaborating in running the "facade." So far, the oil industry has been excluded from foreign takeover, because that would be too blatant. But it is likely to follow, when attention turns elsewhere. Furthermore, Washington has already announced that it intends to impose a "status of forces agreement" that will grant the US the right to maintain military forces in Iraq and, crucially, military bases, the first stable US military bases right at the heart of the world's major energy reserves.

http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=4780&sectionID=36
 
Dec 25, 2003
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#7
nefar you didnt even comment on the previous read, which contained a huge amount of good points.

America is how in debt because of Iraq? 120 Billion? And that's not even counting the deficit during the Bush administration. Offsetting the economic toll of the Iraq war will take years. Far longer than most believe.

And we're after oil? Oil we will not directly see profit from? Oil reserves that are highly overestimated? America is, and will be, bankrupt because of the Iraq war. The oil theory is so based in abstractions, conjurations, and assumptions, it's hard to take seriously.

Even buck-toothed dumb ass Bush knows a major US presence in Iraq will be contested and will possibly do more harm than good. Your piece had absolutely no connection to policy or real life implementation, only interpretive, wishful thinking based on tunnel vision.
 
Jul 7, 2002
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WHITE DEVIL said:
nefar you didnt even comment on the previous read, which contained a huge amount of good points.

America is how in debt because of Iraq? 120 Billion? And that's not even counting the deficit during the Bush administration. Offsetting the economic toll of the Iraq war will take years. Far longer than most believe.

And we're after oil? Oil we will not directly see profit from? Oil reserves that are highly overestimated? America is, and will be, bankrupt because of the Iraq war. The oil theory is so based in abstractions, conjurations, and assumptions, it's hard to take seriously.

Even buck-toothed dumb ass Bush knows a major US presence in Iraq will be contested and will possibly do more harm than good. Your piece had absolutely no connection to policy or real life implementation, only interpretive, wishful thinking based on tunnel vision.

Like Chomsky said, the iraq economy is going to be ran by Western multinational corporations and banks. Iraq has the 2nd largest oil reserves in the world. there is huge profit there. The US has alway wanted those oil reverses, and for a good reasons. No other country should be able to control them, remember the oil embargo in the 70s? ...doesnt mean i agree to this.

America is not goign to bankrupt becuase of the war in iraq. All thought i dont agree with Bush, i do know he wouldn't let his corporate buddies down, his fellow members from the trilateral commisson.


WHITE DEVIL said:
Your piece had absolutely no connection to policy or real life implementation, only interpretive, wishful thinking based on tunnel vision.
Chomsky is the most sought after intellect in the world, I dont think his thinking is based on tunnel vision...lol..jajajaja

and by the way, Pollack also agrees that the reason being the Iraq war was for Oil. Council on Foreign Relations published a piece on it last year.
 
Dec 25, 2003
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#11
Chomsky's work is decent but I'm waiting for all the pieces to fall into place as afar as "Western control". I have no doubt mutlinationals and conglomerates have a huge piece/stake in Iraq, but I still believe their role is often overrated.